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CHANGING THE SYSTEM WITHOUT CHANGING THE
SYSTEM: HOW THE NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE
INTERSTATE COMPACT WOULD LEAVE NONCOMPACTING STATES WITHOUT A LEG TO STAND
ON
Jillian Robbins

“[Y]ou win some, you lose some. And then there’s that little-known
third category.”1
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INTRODUCTION
It is our duty and our privilege as American citizens to cast our
vote for the next president of the United States.2 But voters who live in
populous but solid blue and red states feel as if their votes do not count;
voters who live in less populated swing states get all of the attention
from presidential candidates.3 Every four years, with every presidential
election, we are familiarized with this system the Founding Fathers put
in place in 1787: the Electoral College.4 A presidential candidate has
won the national popular vote but not the Electoral College five times
before.5 It is one of the most criticized provisions of the Constitution,
yet, even though there have been many challenges to it, there has been

2 See U.S. CONST. amend. XV; U.S. CONST. amend. XIX; U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV; U.S.
CONST. amend. XXVI.
3 See infra Section I.B.
4 See generally William C. Kimberling, The Electoral College, DAVE LEIP’S ATLAS OF U.S.
PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTIONS,
http://uselectionatlas.org/INFORMATION/INFORMATION/
electcollege_history.php (last visited Sept. 8, 2015).
5 Craig J. Herbst, Note, Redrawing the Electoral Map: Reforming the Electoral College with
the District-Popular Plan, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV. 217, 218 (2012); see D’Angelo Gore, Presidents
Winning Without Popular Vote, FACTCHECK.ORG, http://www.factcheck.org/2008/03/presidentswinning-without-popular-vote (last updated Dec. 23, 2016); infra Section I.A.
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no success in abolishing it.6 The last time Congress came close to
abolishing the Electoral College was in the late 1960s, following the
1968 Presidential Election between Richard Nixon and Hubert
Humphrey.7 But what if there was a way to change the system, without
exactly changing the system?
The most recent attempt to change the Electoral College system is
through the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact (NPVIC).8
Eleven jurisdictions9 have passed the NPVIC, and as a result, have
agreed to appoint their electors to the presidential candidate that wins
the national popular vote.10 Proponents of the NPVIC believe the states
are exercising their constitutional rights under the Electoral College
provision,11 but opponents of the NPVIC claim that it is unconstitutional
under the Compact Clause, since there is no congressional approval.12
This Note will discuss the constitutional and legal implications of
the NPVIC, and will explore the strengths and weaknesses of the
arguments both for and against its implementation. It will argue that the
NPVIC is constitutional, despite many opponents’ views that it is not,
because it does not encroach on federal supremacy or threaten the
political relevance or rights of non-compacting states.13 This Note
6 Norman R. Williams, Reforming the Electoral College: Federalism, Majoritarianism, and
the Perils of Subconstitutional Change, 100 GEO. L.J. 173 (2011).
7 Paul Boudreaux, The Electoral College and Its Meager Federalism, 88 MARQ. L. REV.
195, 217 (2004).
8 See generally NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE, http://www.nationalpopularvote.com (last
visited Sept. 7, 2015).
9 The eleven jurisdictions that have passed the NPVIC are: California, District of Columbia,
Hawaii, Illinois, Massachusetts, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, Vermont, and
Washington. Status of National Popular Vote Bill in Each State, NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE,
http://www.nationalpopularvote.com/state-status (last visited Apr. 5, 2017). Together, these states
have 165 electoral votes—61% of the 270 electoral votes needed to win the presidency, and the
270 votes needed to enact the NPVIC. See id.
10 See Agreement Among the States to Elect the President by National Popular Vote,
NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE, http://www.nationalpopularvote.com/written-explanation (last visited
Apr. 5, 2017).
11 “Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number
of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may
be entitled in the Congress . . . .” U.S. CONST. art II, § 1, cl. 2.
12 “No State shall, without the Consent of Congress . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact
with another State . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
13 There are many political implications of the NPVIC, but this Note will not address those.
Additionally, this Note will not argue that the Electoral College is unconstitutional under the
Equal Protection Clause, as this principle was shot down by the Supreme Court in the wake of
various actions following the infamous 2000 presidential election. The Court has stated that the
“one person, one vote” doctrine is embodied in the Equal Protection Clause. See Rice v.
Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963). However, the Eastern
District of New York declined to extend this ruling to the Electoral College when a New Yorker
claimed his vote was diluted because of the Electoral College system. See New v. Ashcroft, 293
F.Supp.2d 256 (E.D.N.Y. 2003). The Court explained that “‘[n]either the Constitution nor the
‘one person, one vote’ doctrine vests a right in the citizens of this country to vote for Presidential
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proposes that if a lawsuit between the states resulted from the enactment
of the NPVIC, even if the merits of the claim are constitutional, the
United States Supreme Court should dismiss these cases because the
states bringing the suit would not have standing.14 Finally, this Note
concludes that since congressional approval is not required, and if a
non-compacting state were to bring suit once the NPVIC goes into
effect it would not have Article III or prudential standing, there is
virtually nothing stopping the NPVIC’s enactment in a state.
Part I describes the history of the Electoral College, how it came to
be, and its implications since its enactment—including the times when it
has worked, the times when it has not, and the differences between the
state of the nation then and today.15 It then argues that the Electoral
College is a system no longer suitable for our government today, which
is why the NPVIC is created by a more undivided and cooperative set of
states than the states that created the Electoral College. It then describes
the specific mechanisms of the NPVIC.16
Part II explains the constitutional debate that the NPVIC faces—
that it may be consistent with Article II, Section 1 (the Electoral
College), but may be unconstitutional under Article 1, Section 10 (the
Compact Clause).17 It then concludes that the NPVIC is constitutional
under the Compact Clause and consistent with the Electoral College,
since Article II, Section 1 gives state legislatures plenary power to
appoint their electors in any manner they see fit, and that it does not
require congressional consent under Article 1, Section 10.18 Part II
further analyzes why the NPVIC is constitutional—mainly because it
does not encroach on federal supremacy, nor does it threaten the
political power and rights of non-compacting sister states.19 Part II will
also respond to arguments that the NPVIC is unconstitutional under the
Compact Clause and it will debunk common myths about the NPVIC. 20
electors . . . or empowers the courts to overrule constitutionally mandated procedure in the event
that the vote of the electors is contrary to the popular vote.’” Id. at 259 (citing Trinsey v. United
States, No. CIV.A. 00-5700, 2000 WL 1871697, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 2000)).
14 Courts in the United States are not permitted to issue advisory opinions, meaning there
must be a dispute at issue, with specific parties related to that dispute in front of the court. See
infra notes 220–21 and accompanying text. “The judicial Power shall extend to all
Cases . . . [and] Controversies . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. There are two types of
standing the plaintiff must have in order to proceed in a case against the defendant: Article III
standing and prudential standing. See infra notes 216, 220. This Note explores both kinds of
standing and concludes that the non-compacting sister state would have neither form of standing,
and thus the case would be dismissed.
15 See infra Part I.
16 See infra Part I.
17 See infra Part II.
18 See infra Sections II.A and II.B.
19 See infra Section II.C.
20 See infra Section II.C.

Robbins.2017 (Do Not Delete)

2017]

4/20/2017 5:27 PM

P OP U LA R V O TE I N TE R S T A TE C OM P A C T

5

Part III proposes that if enough states were to pass the NPVIC 21
and a non-compacting sister state and/or its citizens tried to bring suit in
federal court, they would not have standing to do so because they would
be asserting generalized grievances as opposed to a specific, direct,
injury.22 It will explain how courts would address the issues, how they
would analyze and decide the various standing issues, and what the
outcome would be based on a hypothetical case.23
Ultimately, this Note argues that the National Popular Vote
Interstate Compact is constitutional due to the reasons stated above. 24 It
will show that the NPVIC does not violate the Compact Clause (thus it
does not need congressional consent), it is consistent with Article II
Section 1 of the Constitution, and a non-compacting sister state would
not have standing to bring suit to challenge it.25 Thus, if enough states
pass the NPVIC to bring it into effect, there would be virtually nothing
stopping its enactment.26
I. A FRAGMENTED, NEW NATION CREATED THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE:
HOW THE SYSTEM IS NOT SUITABLE TODAY
When the Constitutional Convention (Convention) met in 1787, the
Founding Fathers had a peculiar situation to grapple with: how to elect a
president of a newly formed, democratic, but not yet unified nation. The
state of the nation those hundreds of years ago was, as one can imagine,
vastly different than the nation we know today. The nation, then fresh
out of the Revolutionary War, only had thirteen states—both large and
small—that were not unified by any common ground27, and that were
apprehensive about the concept of a federal government.28 Additionally,
there were four million people spread out with barely any form of
communication or transportation, and thus had no concrete way to keep

21 This is a scenario that is not unrealistic, since the number of states that have passed the
NPVIC have 61% of the total 270 electoral votes needed to elect the president, and the number of
electoral votes needed to enact the NPVIC. See generally NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE, supra note
8. Additionally, while not expressly the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact, national
popular vote legislation has been introduced in forty-seven states, which shows that states are
seriously considering the idea that the Electoral College should be replaced with the national
popular vote. See generally id.; Jennifer S. Hendricks, Popular Election of the President: Using
or Abusing the Electoral College?, 7 ELECTION L.J. 218 (2008).
22 See infra Part III.
23 See infra Part III.
24 See infra Conclusion.
25 See infra Conclusion.
26 See infra Conclusion.
27 See infra notes 35–37 and accompanying text.
28 See Kimberling, supra note 4.
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them connected.29 The Constitutional Convention had several options in
deciding how to elect the next president;30 however, in the end, the
Framers selected the Electoral College. During this time, political
parties did not nearly have the influence that they have today,31 and
there was no way for the Framers to predict just how influential political
parties would become, and the effect they would have on the Electoral
College.32
Much of the debate surrounding the method of electing the
president during this time was between larger free states and smaller
slave states: the former wanted a national popular vote, but the latter
were concerned that their political voice would not be heard and they
would run the risk of having to give up their slaves.33 Thus, the
Convention’s goal was to appease southerners with slaveholding
interests.34 The South during this time wanted a guarantee that they
would still dominate the nation and could continue to possess slaves;
with a national popular vote, this would not be the case.35
Another reason the Convention rejected the idea of a national
popular vote was because there would be little to no way for citizens to
gain information about all the candidates and make an educated
29
30

Id.
The Constitutional Convention considered having Congress elect the president. However, it
was rejected for many reasons, mainly because it would disturb the balance of power between the
branches, would lead to too many “hard feelings” on Congress, and could potentially cause
corruption. Id. Additionally, the Convention considered having state legislatures elect the
president, but this was also rejected because a president would be too “beholden” to state
legislatures. Id.; see Matthew J. Festa, Note, The Origins and Constitutionality of State Unit
Voting in the Electoral College, 54 VAND L. REV. 2099 (2001). Electoral College did not result
from an overall vision for the nation by the Framers; it was a product of strenuous debate. Id.
31 See Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV.
L. REV. 2311, 2313–15 (2006).
The Framers had not anticipated the nature of the democratic competition that would
emerge in government and in the electorate. . . . Justice Jackson astutely recognized
that the separation of powers no longer works as originally envisioned because
interbranch dynamics have changed with the rise of political parties, which . . . ha[s]
diminished the incentives of Congress to monitor and check the President. . . . [T]he
degree and kind of competition between the legislative and executive branches vary
significantly, and may all but disappear, depending on whether the House, Senate, and
presidency are divided or unified by [a] political party.
Id.
32
33

Herbst, supra note 5, at 221.
Roberta A. Yard, Comment, American Democracy and Minority Rule: How the United
States Can Reform Its Electoral Process to Ensure “One Person, One Vote”, 42 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 185, 187 (2001).
34 Victor Williams & Alison M. Macdonald, Rethinking Article II, Section 1 and Its Twelfth
Amendment Restatement: Challenging Our Nation’s Malapportioned, Undemocratic Presidential
Election Systems, 77 MARQ. L. REV. 201, 202 (1994).
35 Id. With the enactment of the 13th Amendment, to think that our current system of electing
the President of our country was a result of appeasing slaveholder interests is something that is
unimaginable, and something that demonstrates just how outdated the system is.
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decision. Thus, they would be inclined to vote for the candidate from
their own state, since that was all they knew, or they would be forced to
make a completely uninformed decision.36 James Madison himself said
that the people would never be informed enough to be able to choose
the executive properly.37 All of this evidence shows that the Electoral
College was implemented in a fragmented nation during a tumultuous
time, with little to no communication between voters—all factors that
are not applicable today.38
All of these issues bear the question: how did the original Electoral
College turn into the winner-take-all system we see today? The rising
prominence of political parties in the 19th century pushed the states to
adopt the winner-take-all system; the last time a majority of states used
the district-plan39 instead of the winner-take-all plan was in 1800.40 The
rise of political parties meant that the Democrats and Republicans were
feeling the pressure, both locally and nationally, to ensure that their
party was in control—the winner-take-all system was the way to
achieve this goal.41
Because the Electoral College’s foundations are extremely
outdated and inapplicable to how society looks today, the United States
needs a new system.42 The next section of this Note will further this
analysis by exploring the instances in which the Electoral College has

36 Connecticut delegate Roger Sherman said at the time that the “sense of the nation would be
better expressed by the legislature, than by the people at large.” Ky Fullerton, Comment, Bush,
Gore, and the 2000 Presidential Election: Time for the Electoral College to Go?, 80 OR. L. REV.
717, 719 (2001); see also Herbst, supra note 5, at 221.
37 JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 306 (1966).
38 As of 2013, a reported 116,291,000 households have Internet access. Thom File & Camille
Ryan, Computer and Internet Use in the United States: 2013, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU
(2014), https://www.census.gov/history/pdf/acs-internet2013.pdf. A reported 69% of Americans
get their news from their laptop or computer. How Americans Get Their News, AM. PRESS INST.,
(2014),
http://www.americanpressinstitute.org/publications/reports/survey-research/howamericans-get-news. This shows how Americans are more connected than ever before and they
are capable of receiving news instantly at any time of day.
39 The district-plan allocated a certain amount of electoral votes to each district within a state,
rather than to each state. This made states more fragmented and thus the allocation of electoral
votes more fragmented as well. Norman R. Williams, Why the National Popular Vote Compact is
Unconstitutional, 2012 BYU L. REV. 1523 (2012), Section III.C.
40 Id.
41 Id. The first president of the United States, George Washington, pleaded against political
parties in general; fearing the effects they would have on the country. He stated in his farewell
address:
However [political parties] may now and then answer popular ends, they are
likely . . . to become potent engines, by which cunning, ambitious, and
unprincipled men will be enabled to subvert the power of the people and to
usurp for themselves the reins of government, destroying afterwards the very
engines which have lifted them to unjust dominion.
George Washington, Former President, Farewell Address (Sept. 17, 1796).
42 See supra Part I.
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failed us.
A.

The Electoral College Has Failed Us: Historical Considerations

A presidential candidate has won the national popular vote but not
the Electoral College, thus losing the presidency, five times in our
nation’s history: 1824, 1876, 1888, 2000, and 2016.43
In 1824, the Electoral College was deadlocked in the presidential
election between Andrew Jackson and John Quincy Adams, so the
House of Representatives acted as the tiebreaker vote to determine who
the next president would be.44 Ultimately, Adams prevailed in this
election, but only after allegations of corruption that Adams created a
secret deal with the House of Representatives in order to secure the
presidency, and only after Jackson won 38,000 more votes in the
national popular vote.
In 1876, the Democratic candidate, Samuel J. Tilden, won the
national popular vote by 200,000 votes, but was one electoral vote short
of winning the presidency—Republican candidate Rutherford B. Hayes
ended up winning that election.45 Hayes’ supporters devised a plan to
secure all the disputed electoral votes, which included promising a
federal subsidy for the Texas and Pacific Railway Company to a
Southern Congressman; in exchange, the Congressman abstained from
the Democratic filibuster against the decision of the Electoral
Commission, resulting in Hayes’ victory. 46
In 1888, no fraud was involved, but the Democratic candidate and
then-president Grover Cleveland won the national popular vote by about
100,000 votes to Republican counterpart Benjamin Harrison, but
Cleveland lost in the Electoral College.47 Cleveland carried many small
43 Herbst, supra note 5, at 229. Although only five times may not seem like many, there have
been a total of fifty-eight presidential elections—so the Electoral College has failed us five out of
fifty-eight times, or about 8%. See id.; see also Adam Schleifer, Interstate Agreement for
Electoral Reform, 40 AKRON L. REV. 717, 721 (2007). At the time of this writing in the Fall of
2015, the 2000 election was the last time a presidential candidate won the Electoral College but
not the national popular vote. Since then, the 2016 election can be added to this list. Hillary
Clinton beat Donald Trump by almost 2.9 million votes in the national popular vote, but Trump
beat Clinton by seventy-four electoral votes. Gregory Krieg, It’s Official: Clinton Swamps Trump
in Popular Vote, CNN (Dec. 22, 2016), http://www.cnn.com/2016/12/21/politics/donald-trumphillary-clinton-popular-vote-final-count.
44 See Christopher Anglim, A Selective, Annotated Bibliography on the Electoral College: Its
Creation, History, and Prospects for Reform, 85 L. LIBR. J. 297, 307 (1993); Fullerton, supra
note 36, at 728.
45 Anglim, supra note 44, at 309.
46 Id.
47 Brandon H. Robb, Comment, Making the Electoral College Work Today: The Agreement
Among the States to Elect the President by National Popular Vote, 54 LOY. L. REV. 419, 442
(2008).
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and mid-sized states by wide margins, but Harrison carried most of the
large states by small margins, meaning that even though Harrison did
not win the large states by much, he received all of the electoral votes
because of the winner-take-all system, which is still in place today.48
Over a century later, the Electoral College failed us again, in the
infamous 2000 election between George W. Bush and Al Gore49—the
election that sparked the current movement to reform the presidential
election process.50 After a long back and forth series of both candidates
winning different major states, and with no clear winner of the election
in sight, it seemed as though one state’s electoral votes would determine
the outcome of the election: Florida.51 In the end, Bush won the election
by receiving 271 electoral votes—one more than needed—but Gore
won the national popular vote: he had 50,999,897 votes whereas Bush
had 50,456,002 votes—over 500,000 fewer.52 As a consequence of this
election, Gore filed a complaint, which made its way all the way to the
Supreme Court.53
While the period between the second and third times the Electoral
College failed us was over 100 years, the span between the third and
fourth times was only sixteen years. In the 2016 election, perhaps the
most controversial of them all, Republican candidate Donald Trump
surpassed Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton by seventy-four
Electoral College votes, whereas Clinton surpassed Donald Trump by
2.9 million votes in the national popular vote.54
B.

Common Criticisms of the Electoral College

One criticism of the Electoral College is that it causes candidates to
ignore the larger states with the largest populations in favor of less
populous, but more “battleground,” states.55 For example, New York,
California, and Texas are relatively solid Democratic, Democratic, and
Republican states, respectively, and they also have three of the largest
48
49

Id. at 442–43.
See 2000 Official Presidential General Election Results, FED. ELECTION COMM’N,
http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/2000presgeresults.htm (last updated Dec. 2001).
50 See Note, Rethinking the Electoral College Debate: The Framers, Federalism, and One
Person, One Vote, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2526, 2526 (2001).
51 Fullerton, supra note 36, at 729–30.
52 See FED. ELECTION COMM’N, supra note 49.
53 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 111 (2000) (per curiam). While this case does not have much to
do with the Electoral College itself, it is an important piece of the story. The Supreme Court
reversed the Florida Supreme Court’s decision that Gore satisfied his burden of proof with respect
to the County’s failure to tabulate the 9,000 ballots that the machine did not detect a vote. Id. at
102.
54 See Krieg, supra note 43.
55 See infra note 57 and accompanying text.

Robbins.2017 (Do Not Delete)

10

C A R D OZ O LA W R E V I E W DE • N OV O

4/20/2017 5:27 PM

[2017

populations in the entire nation.56 However, in the 2012 presidential
election, from June 2012 to Election Day, presidential candidates
Barack Obama and Mitt Romney made only a combined total of thirtysix visits to California, thirty-four visits to New York, and fourteen
visits to Texas, whereas they made a combined seventy-six visits to
Ohio, a state with a population of only 11,550,839 in 2012—more than
26 million fewer people than California.57 Additionally, vice
presidential candidates Joe Biden and Paul Ryan made only a combined
total of three visits to California, five visits to New York, and four visits
to Texas, whereas they made a combined forty-eight visits to Ohio. This
is a staggering difference.58
Another criticism of the Electoral College is that it discourages
voter turnout.59 For example, in 2012, voter turnout was 11% higher in
battleground states than in the rest of the country. 60 In that election,
voter turnout was 71.1% in Colorado—a battleground state—but only
59.4% in the rest of the nation.61 The percentage of voters who
participated in the 2004 election, as compared to the 2000 election, was
almost 5% higher, but this increase is only due to the battleground
states.62 This shows that many people who do not live in large swing
states—the majority of Americans63—feel as though their votes do not
56 Annual Estimates of the Resident Population for the United States, Regions, States, and
Puerto Rico: April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2016, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2016),
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2016/demo/popest/state-total.html (click first Excel table). As
of 2012, New York had an estimated population of 19,602,769 California had an estimated
population of 38,011,074 and Texas had an estimated population of 26,071,655.
57 Id.; Presidential Campaign Stops: Who’s Going Where, WASH. POST (Sept. 10, 2012),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/2012-presidential-campaign-visits
(explaining that the presidential candidates made a combined thirty-five visits to Iowa and fortyseven visits to Virginia, but only fourteen visits to Texas). These statistics show that the Electoral
College discourages candidates from visiting the states with the largest populations, but rather
focuses the candidates on visiting “swing” states, even though they have significantly lower
populations. As of September 2016, half of the 105 presidential campaign visits have only been in
five states—Pennsylvania, Ohio, Florida, North Carolina, and Virginia. Two-thirds of
Presidential Campaign Is in Just 6 States, NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE,
http://www.nationalpopularvote.com/campaign-events-2016 (last visited Apr. 17, 2017). Since
July 2016, thirty-one states have been ignored by the candidates. Id.
58 Presidential Campaign Stops: Who’s Going Where, supra note 57.
59 JOHN R. KOZA ET AL., EVERY VOTE EQUAL: A STATE-BASED PLAN FOR ELECTING THE
PRESIDENT BY NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE 37–38 (4th ed. 2013). Additionally, after the infamous
2000 presidential election, the subsequent 2004 and 2008 presidential elections saw higher voter
turnouts. Voter Turnout in Presidential Elections: 1828–2012, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY
PROJECT, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/data/turnout.php (last visited Apr. 17, 2017).
60 KOZA, supra note 59, at 37.
61 Id.
62 Pietro S. Nivola, Thinking About Political Polarization, BROOKINGS INST. (Jan. 1, 2005),
http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2005/01/01politics-nivola (explaining that since the
Electoral College has narrowed elections—like the 2000 presidential election—down to the final
votes in one battleground state, voters elsewhere feel as if their votes do not matter).
63 There were only nine swing states in the 2012 election: Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Nevada,
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count, since their state will almost definitely go a certain way. 64
Yet another criticism is that the Electoral College system is
unnecessarily complex. Instead of a direct national popular vote—where
every vote is counted as one and added up—there are many
complexities in the Electoral College.65 Votes must be counted in every
state, electoral votes need to be delegated, and the president has to be
chosen through those electoral votes.66 It is a far more complex system
of voting than necessary for a democratic nation; a national popular vote
would increase efficiency and would be much simpler.67
Another major problem with the Electoral College is the winnertake-all system it implements.68 With this system, each state gives its
entire slate of electoral votes to the winner of its statewide popular
vote.69 Disadvantages of this system include ignoring minority
candidates, and creating the battleground states which garner so much
of the presidential candidates’ attention, leaving non-battleground states
without any presidential candidate influence.70 For example, if a
candidate only has one more vote than another, they will win the entire
slate of electoral votes, even though they only won by one vote.71
C.

Other Electoral College Reform Ideas That Fell Short

Many of these
representatives and
system.72 However,
involve completely

common criticisms have led some (congressional
others, alike) to propose various reforms to the
these proposals to reform the Electoral College
changing the system and even the Constitution.

New Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio, Virginia, and Wisconsin. Chris Cillizza, The 9 Swing
States of 2012, WASH. POST (Apr. 16, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/
post/the-9-swing-states-of-2012/2012/04/16/gIQABuXaLT_blog.html. As of September 2016,
there are only eleven swing states in the 2016 election, the same swing states as 2012 plus
Michigan
and
Pennsylvania.
The
Battleground
States
Project,
POLITICO,
http://www.politico.com/2016-election/swing-states (last visited Apr. 17, 2017).
64 Stanley Chang, Recent Development, Updating the Electoral College: The National
Popular Vote Legislation, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 205, 218 (2007).
65 GEORGE C. EDWARDS III, WHY THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE IS BAD FOR AMERICA (2d ed.
2011).
66 Elizabeth D. Lauzon, Challenges to Presidential Electoral College and Electors, 20 A.L.R.
FED. 2d 183, Part I § 2 (2007).
67 Id.
68 This winner-take-all system has been in effect since 1836. Herbst, supra note 5, at 230.
Forty-eight states currently use the winner-take-all system—the exceptions being Maine and
Nebraska, which allocate their electoral votes by district. Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Lauzon, supra note 66.
72 See infra note 83 and accompanying text.
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Thus, there is no feasible way these plans could go into effect.73
After the infamous 2000 election,74 Senator Dick Durbin and
Representative Ray LaHood advocated for a direct national popular vote
plan, mainly proposing that a candidate must receive at least 40% of the
whole number of votes in order to win the general election.75 If neither
candidate gets at least 40%, the candidates participate in a run-off
election.76 While there are many benefits to this system,77 it would
completely destroy the Electoral College in its entirety, which would
require Congress to come to a decision to make a constitutional
amendment—an unlikely scenario.78
Another commonly known proposal to reform the Electoral
College is the district-plan.79 This would involve giving electoral votes
to each congressional district, rather than to states as a whole (much like
the system Maine and Nebraska still use today) 80 and having the winner
of each district get those electoral votes.81 However, the main problem
with this plan is that it does not necessarily guarantee the winner of the
national popular vote the presidency—we could still run into the same
problems that we have with the Electoral College. It is still the same
winner-take-all system that the Electoral College implements except
instead of a state winner-take-all, it is a district winner-take-all. This
may break up the current Electoral College system into smaller pieces,
but the same problems remain.82
D.

The NPVIC: An Overview

There were many attempts to abolish the Electoral College in the
73
74
75
76
77

See Fullerton, supra note 36, at Part V.
See supra Section I.A.
S.J. Res. 56, 106th Cong. (2000); H.R.J. Res. 23, 106th Cong. (1999).
S.J. Res. 56, 106th Cong. (2000); H.R.J. Res. 23, 106th Cong. (1999).
Fullerton, supra note 36. For example, there would be no dispute as to which candidate
wins the election—the candidate who wins the national popular vote wins.
78 The process to amend the Constitution is outlined in Article V: “The Congress, whenever
two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this
Constitution . . . which . . . shall be valid . . . when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of
the several States . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. V. Since the Constitution was enacted in the 18th
century, there have been over 10,000 proposed amendments in Congress; only thirty-three
survived two-thirds of both houses, and twenty-seven have been ratified. Darren R. Latham, The
Historical Amendability of the American Constitution: Speculations on an Empirical
Problematic, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 145, 165 (2005). These numbers show how difficult it is for the
Constitution to be amended.
79 Fullerton, supra note 36, at 733; Herbst, supra note 5, at 238.
80 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 805(2) (West 2008); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-714
(West 2009).
81 Fullerton, supra note 36, at 733.
82 Id. at 734.
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past through congressional action83 and some recent proposals,84 but in
2006, John Koza co-authored a book proposing the National Popular
Vote Interstate Compact.85 He explains that his motivation was the lack
of democratic elements in the current system of electing the president.86
One year later, NPVIC legislation began to emerge in forty-two states.87
Maryland became the first state to enact the legislation when Governor
Martin O’Malley signed it into law on April 10, 2007.88 In 2008, New
Jersey, Illinois, and Hawaii followed suit and enacted the legislation.89
One year later in 2009, Washington State enacted the legislation. 90 In
2010, Massachusetts and District of Columbia enacted the legislation.91
Vermont and California followed suit in 2011,92 Rhode Island in 2013,93

83 Most notably, in the 1968 election between Richard Nixon and Hubert Humphrey, Nixon
took a very small plurality of the national popular vote (43.3% to 42.7%), but won by a landslide
in the Electoral College (301 to 191). Boudreaux, supra note 7, at 217. This election caused
Senator Birch Bayh to propose a constitutional amendment to abolish the Electoral College in
favor of a national popular vote. Symposium, A Modern Father of our Constitution: An Interview
with Former Senator Birch Bayh, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 781, 783 (2010). Ultimately, the
resolution failed due to lack of votes to end the filibuster blocking the bill. Id. Additionally,
Supreme Court justices have voiced their opinion when it comes to abolishing the Electoral
College: “To abolish [the Electoral College] and substitute direct election of the President, so that
every vote wherever cast would have equal weight in calculating the result, would seem to me a
gain for simplicity and integrity of our governmental processes.” Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 234
(1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
84 See supra Section I.C.
85 KOZA, supra note 59; see e.g., News History, NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE,
http://www.nationalpopularvote.com/news-history (last visited Apr. 5, 2017) (John Koza is the
“originator of the plan.”). When states pass this legislation, they are pledging to allocate all of
their electoral votes to the winner of the national popular vote, no matter which way the state
itself may go (Democratic or Republican) during a presidential election. Id.
86 Koza first explains how anyone who does not live in a swing state has an irrelevant vote
under the current system, and how voters in four-fifths of the states are ignored in presidential
elections. KOZA, supra note 59, at 255. Additionally, he explains how in four out of fifty-six
presidential elections, the Electoral College elected a president that did not win the national
popular vote. Id. at 256.
87 See generally NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE, supra note 8.
88 MD. CODE ANN. ELEC. LAW § 8-5A-01 (West 2013); see Associated Press, Maryland
Sidesteps Electoral College, NBC NEWS (Apr. 11, 2007, 11:17 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/
id/18053715.
89 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:36-4 (West 2014); 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 20/1-10 (West 2015);
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14D-1 (West 2008).
90 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 29A.56.300 (West 2014); see also Brad Shannon, State Joins
Electoral
College
Pact,
THE
OLYMPIAN
(Apr.
29,
2009,
12:00
AM),
http://www.theolympian.com/news/local/politics-government/election/article25232041.html.
91 H.B. 4156, 186th Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2009); see also Steve LeBlanc,
Massachusetts Governor Signs National Popular Vote Bill, NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE (Aug. 4,
2010), http://archive.nationalpopularvote.com/pages/articles/washingtonexaminer_20100804.php;
D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-1051.01 (West 2013).
92 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2752 (West 2011); CAL. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 6921 (West 2012);
Hendrik Hertzberg, Electoral College Halfway Fixed!, THE NEW YORKER (July 23, 2013),
http://www.newyorker.com/news/hendrik-hertzberg/electoral-college-halfway-fixed.
93 17 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 17-4.2-1 (West 2013); Hertzberg, supra note 92.
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and finally New York on April 14, 2014.94
The mechanisms of the NPVIC are relatively simple. First, the
compact would not become effective until it is enacted by states that, in
total, have 270 electoral votes—the majority necessary for electing the
president in the Electoral College.95 The compact would not change the
overall scheme of the Electoral College—each state still retains its
allotted number of electoral votes based on its amount of representation
in Congress.96 The NPVIC solely proposes that the states that pass the
compact give their allotted electoral votes to the winner of the National
Popular Vote, rather than the winner of the popular vote in the state.97
Koza proposes that the NPVIC would reform the Electoral College in a
way that retains the American federalist system of state control over
elections, rather than abolish the Electoral College.98
The NPVIC bill itself is short and simple, outlining the
mechanisms described above as well as other provisions.99 Article III of
the bill sets out the specific mechanisms of how the compact would
work during a presidential election: the chief election official of each
state determines the number of votes for each presidential slate in each
state and adds the votes together to create a national popular vote and
determines which candidate is the winner.100 Each member state then
makes a final determination of the number of popular votes cast in its
state at least six days before the day fixed by law for the meeting and
voting by the presidential electors; then, it communicates an “official
statement of such determination” within twenty-four hours to the chief
election official of every other member state.101 The chief election
official of each compacting state treats this official statement as

94 N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 12-402 (McKinney 2014); see also Hendrik Hertzberg, National
Popular Vote: New York State Climbs Aboard, THE NEW YORKER (Apr. 16, 2014),
http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/national-popular-vote-new-york-state-climbsaboard.
95 KOZA, supra note 59, at 258.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 Article I states that any state can become a member of the agreement by enacting the
legislation. Article II states that “each member state shall conduct a statewide popular election for
President and Vice President,” which is the current system in place. KOZA, supra note 59, at 559–
60; The Agreement Among the States to Elect the President by National Popular Vote, NATIONAL
POPULAR VOTE, http://www.nationalpopularvote.com/sites/default/files/eve-4th-ed-ch6-webv1.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2017). The majority of this Note will focus on Articles III and IV of
the NPVIC. The entirety of the bill can be found at http://www.nationalpopularvote.com/pages/
misc/888wordcompact.php.
100 The Agreement Among the States to Elect the President by National Popular Vote,
NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE, http://www.nationalpopularvote.com/sites/default/files/eve-4th-edch6-web-v1.pdf (last visited Apr. 5, 2017).
101 Id.
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conclusive.102 Once the number of popular votes is determined, each
member state allocates its electoral votes to the projected winner of the
national popular vote, regardless of the turnout in the state.103 In the
extremely rare event of a tie for the national popular vote winner, the
allocated elector votes will go to the winner of the popular vote in that
specific state rather than the winner of the national popular vote.104
Article IV of the bill outlines other miscellaneous provisions.105 It
reiterates that the agreement only goes into effect when the states that
enacted it possess more than 270 total electoral votes. 106 It also explains
that any member state can withdraw from the agreement, except a state
cannot withdraw six months or less before the end of a president’s
term—this prevents states not being happy with how the presidential
election may have turned out from being able to withdraw too close to
Election Night.107 Additionally, it explains that the chief executive of
each member state shall notify the chief executive of all the other states
of when the NPVIC has been enacted and has taken effect; it also
articulates that the NPVIC will terminate if the Electoral College is
abolished.108 It concludes by determining that if any provision is held
invalid, such invalidation will not affect the remaining provisions.109
The majority of this Note will focus on the constitutional
implications of Article III and Article IV of the NPVIC. The next
section of this Note will explore the constitutional implications of the
NPVIC and how they can be resolved.
II. A CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE—THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE VERSUS
THE COMPACT CLAUSE
The National Popular Vote Interstate Compact presents a unique
debate; it seems as though it is consistent with the Electoral College
Clause, but could be unconstitutional under the Compact Clause. This
Part will first explain why the NPVIC is consistent with the Electoral
College Clause—since it allows states to exercise power they already
have under Article II, Section 1.110 It will then respond to common
102
103
104
105
106
107

Id.; see also KOZA, supra note 59.
KOZA, supra note 59.
Id.
See generally NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE, supra note 8.
See generally id.
This is specifically designed so if a state is not satisfied with the outcome of the election—
i.e., if the candidate it believed would win the national popular vote did not—they cannot back
out of the compact on Election Night, or too close beforehand. See generally id.
108 See generally id.
109 See generally id.
110 See infra Section II.A.
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constitutionality concerns under the Compact Clause—since under the
Constitution states cannot contract together without congressional
consent111—and explain how these common criticisms can be defeated.
It will mainly respond to arguments that the entirety of the NPVIC is
unconstitutional under the Compact Clause.112
A.

The Electoral College: Article II, Section 1

This Note previously explores the history of the Electoral
College113, but it is worth noting that during the Constitutional
Convention, states’ rights advocates were worried that a national
popular vote would create a more powerful, partisan federal
government, while leaving little role for state governments.114 This is
interesting, in hindsight, since the Electoral College ended up having
this exact effect—the effect that, originally, states were concerned
would be an effect of a national popular vote.115
Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution states, “Each State shall
appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a
Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and
Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress.”116
This inherently means that the legislature of each state can choose the
manner in which to appoint their electors—it does not say specifically
how the number of electors should be appointed, only that it must be
equal to the number of Senators and Representatives.
In McPherson v. Blacker,117 the Supreme Court declared
constitutional the challenged manner of the appointment of electors in
the state of Michigan: the election of an elector and an alternate elector
in each district, and of an elector and alternate elector at large in each of
two districts.118 While there are differences between this method of
appointing electors and those set out in the NPVIC, the Court’s
reasoning in this case can be applied to the NPVIC. The Court reasoned:

111
112

See infra Section II.B.
Derek T. Muller, The Compact Clause and the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact,
6 ELECTION L.J. 372 (2007); see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
113 See supra Section I.A.
114 Amanda Kelley Myers, Comment, Importing Democracy: Can Lessons Learned from
Germany, India, and Australia Help Reform the American Electoral System?, 37 PEPP. L. REV.
1113, 1118 (2010) (quoting Martin J. Siegel, Congressional Power Over Presidential Elections:
The Constitutionality of the Help America Vote Act Under Article II, Section 1, 28 VT. L. REV.
373, 378 (2004)).
115 See supra Section I.B.
116 U.S. CONST. art II, § 1, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
117 146 U.S. 1 (1892).
118 Id. at 6, 23–24.
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[Article II, Section 1, Clause 2] does not read that the people or the
citizens shall appoint, but that “each state shall[]” . . . . Hence the
insertion of [the language, “in such manner as the legislature thereof
may direct”], while operating as a limitation upon the state in respect
of any attempt to circumscribe the legislative power, cannot be held
to operate as a limitation on that power itself. . . . [The Constitution]
recognizes that the people act through their representatives in the
legislature, and leaves it to the legislature exclusively to define the
method of [appointing electors]. . . . [I]t is seen that from the
formation of the government until now the practical construction of
the clause has conceded plenary power to the state legislatures in the
matter of the appointment of electors.119

This is a broad reading of the Electoral College clause that directly
applies to the NPVIC; the states possess the plenary power to appoint
electors how the legislatures see fit, and the people of that state exercise
their rights through their elected officials.120 The NPVIC does not seek
to abolish the Electoral College system, or even change it at all, but
rather to allocate their electoral votes differently—a right they explicitly
have under the Constitution.121 Some critics of the NPVIC contend that
the only reason the Court allowed Michigan to change its electoral
appointment plan from winner-take-all to district-based is because states
had already done so in the past, so there was little to no risk in allowing
some states to do that now.122 However, this argument presumes that it
is unrealistic for the Court to adopt a principle that has never been
adopted before, which is not the case.123 The Court has shown in the
past that it is not afraid to go against years of precedent in the interest of
justice; it is not far-fetched to say that the Court would be comfortable
making a decision about the national popular vote in lieu of the
Electoral College, a far less drastic issue than the ones previously
cited.124
Over a century later—after the infamous 2000 presidential
election—the Supreme Court upheld the same principles set out in

119
120
121

Id. at 25–27, 35.
Id.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2; Strunk v. U.S. House of Representatives, 24 F. App’x 21 (2d
Cir. 2001) (explaining that when a New York voter tried to bring suit challenging the manner in
which electors are selected, his case was moot because states are constitutionally empowered to
determine how to select electors).
122 Williams, supra note 39, at 1581–82.
123 There have been many instances in American history where the Court overturned years of
precedent and adopted policies that had never been seen before, and were in fact revolutionary.
The Court is clearly comfortable with making these kinds of decisions. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct.
2584 (2015).
124 See supra note 123.
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McPherson,125 showing that it did not seek to overturn over 100 years of
precedent regarding the Electoral College.126 When evaluating Florida’s
manner of appointing electors, Chief Justice Rehnquist said in his
concurring opinion, “[W]ith respect to a Presidential election, the court
must be . . . mindful of the legislature’s role under Article II in choosing
the manner of appointing electors . . . .”127 This shows that it is likely
that the Court will give deference to a state’s method of appointing
electors; thus, as long as a state is following the Electoral College
system but appointing the electors in a different way, the Court will give
deference to a state’s plenary power.128 The NPVIC does exactly this;129
it retains the federalist system of the Electoral College laid out in
Article II, Section 1,130 while allowing the states to appoint their
electors in a different manner.
In order for a manner of electoral appointment to be considered
unconstitutional, it must offend the Constitution.131 This may seem like
a broad standard, but the Eastern District of Virginia, in explaining why
a general ticket system of electoral appointment does not offend the
Constitution in such a way that deems it unconstitutional, stated that the
general ticket system “is but another form of the unit rule”—the unit
rule being Article II Section 1.132 The court explains that the unit rule is
the system already in place—the Electoral College.133 The NPVIC is
another form of the unit rule as well since it does not seek to abolish the
Electoral College or any other constitutional provision, but rather
changes the manner in which electors are appointed, a right that the
states already possess.134
B.

The Compact Clause: Article I, Section 10

The Compact Clause has British roots; during the colonial era, the
Crown sought to resolve disputes between different colonies from
across the Atlantic Ocean.135 Once the Revolutionary War was over,

125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135

See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
See id.
Id. at 114 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
Id.
See generally NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE, supra note 8.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
Williams v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 288 F.Supp. 622 (E.D. Va. 1968).
Id. at 626–27.
Id.
See KOZA, supra note 59; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
Felix Frankfurter & James M. Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution—A Study in
Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE L.J. 685 (1925). Frankfurter and Landis explain that there were
two modes of settling these kinds of disputes. Id. at 692.
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many of these disputes were left unresolved, and the United States was
under the Crown’s reign, and the new United States needed to find a
way to resolve these disputes on its own.136 In the end, the Compact
Clause of the Constitution was born during the Constitutional
Convention.137 The Framers created the Compact Clause so that the
states could not come together to threaten the Union without
congressional consent.138 The Framers sought stronger language than
that in the Articles of Confederation in order to ensure that state power
would not endanger the Union.139
The Compact Clause in the Constitution states, “No State shall,
without the Consent of Congress . . . enter into any Agreement or
Compact with another State . . . .”140 While this language may seem
very restrictive, the Supreme Court has recognized that congressional
consent is not feasible or necessary in every agreement between states,
so it has held that congressional consent is only required when a
compact encroaches on federal supremacy. 141 The Court reached this
conclusion when it was resolving a border dispute between Virginia and
Tennessee, and held that a border dispute between two states does not
concern the federal interest.142 Since Virginia v. Tennessee was decided,
many courts have followed this proposition that congressional consent
is not required unless the compact encroaches on federal supremacy.143
If an agreement was reached, not infrequently after years of torturous discussion, the
further approval of the Crown was required. If negotiations failed or in lieu of such
direct settlement, the second mode of procedure . . . . was an appeal to the Crown,
followed normally by a reference of the controversy to a Royal
Commission . . . . [which] bore the characteristics of a litigation.
Id. at 692–93.
136 Id. at 693.
137 Id. at 694.
138 Michael S. Greve, The Heritage Guide to the Constitution, The Compact Clause, THE
HERITAGE FOUNDATION, http://www.heritage.org/constitution/#!/articles/1/essays/75/compactclause (last visited Apr. 17, 2017).
139 Id.
140 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
141 Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 519 (1893).
142 “The mere selection of parties to run and designate the boundary line between two states,
or to designate what line should be run, of itself imports no agreement to accept the line run by
them, and such action of itself does not come within the prohibition [of the Compact Clause].” Id.
at 520.
143 See, e.g., U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452 (1978) (In U.S. Steel
Corp., the Court held that the Multistate Tax Compact at issue was constitutional, since not all
agreements between states are subject to the Compact Clause. In coming to this determination,
the Court cites Justice Fields in Virginia v. Tennessee: “Looking at the clause in which the terms
‘compact’ or ‘agreement’ appear, it is evident that the prohibition is directed to the formation of
any combination tending to the increase of political power in the states, which may encroach
upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United States.”) (citing Virginia v. Tennessee,
148 U.S. at 519); see also Star Sci. Inc. v. Beales, 278 F.3d 339 (4th Cir. 2002) (noting that in
U.S. Steel Corp., the Supreme Court upheld a compact resulting in reciprocal State legislation);
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This Note argues that the NPVIC is constitutional under the Compact
Clause because it does not encroach on said federal supremacy.
The Supreme Court in later cases followed the propositions set out
in Virginia.144 In U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Commission, 145 the
Court expanded on the Virginia rule, by creating a test for compacts that
are alleged violations of the Compact Clause.146 The Court explained
that the “test is whether the Compact enhances state power quoad147 the
National Government.”148 The Court ruled that the Multistate Tax
Compact at issue was constitutional since it did not purport to authorize
the member states to exercise any powers they otherwise could not have
if there was no compact.149 Additionally, the Court noted that many
times in the past it had upheld a variety of interstate agreements that did
not have congressional consent, and even those that resulted in
reciprocal state legislation.150 This logic applies to the NPVIC since it
would result in reciprocal state legislation in the sense that other,
originally non-compacting, states may choose to enact the NPVIC once
it goes into effect.
Another factor the Court in U.S. Steel Corp. relies on is making
sure that the compact at issue does not have an impact on “federal
structure.”151 The definition of structure is, “[t]he arrangement of and
relations between the parts or elements of something complex.” 152 The
definition of federal is, “[h]aving or relating to a system of government
in which several states form a unity but remain independent in internal
affairs.”153 Thus, when the two definitions are combined, it follows that
federal structure inherently refers to the relations between the federal
government. The NPVIC would not have an impact on federal structure
since it does not purport to change the Constitution or any aspect of the
federal government, nor does it seek to enhance states’ power at the
expense of the federal government;154 it strictly has to do with states’
Ne. Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 472 U.S. 159, 176 (1985) (holding
that the state bank statute at issue was constitutional, since “[t]o the extent that the state statutes
might conflict in a particular situation with other federal statutes . . . they would be pre-empted by
those statutes, and therefore any Compact Clause argument would be academic[]”).
144 See supra note 143.
145 434 U.S. 452 (1978).
146 U.S. Steel Corp., 434 U.S. 452.
147 The definition of quoad is “with respect to” or “regarding.” Quoad, COLLINS ENGLISH
DICTIONARY, https://www.collinsdictionary.com/us/dictionary/english/quoad (last visited Apr.
17, 2017).
148 U.S. Steel Corp., 434 U.S. at 473.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 469–70.
151 Id. at 470–71.
152 Structure, OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH (3d ed. 2016).
153 Federal, OXFORD DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH (3d ed. 2016).
154 See infra note 206.
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rights.155 The Court in multiple instances has deemed certain compacts,
even those that result in reciprocal state legislation—a political effect—
not to have an impact on the federal structure.156
C.

The NPVIC Does Not Encroach on Federal Supremacy, or on the
Rights of Non-Compacting Sister States

This section of the Note will directly respond to arguments against
the NPVIC,157 in which opponents primarily argue that the NPVIC is
unconstitutional because it encroaches on federal supremacy and on the
rights of non-compacting sister states.158 This Note argues that these
arguments are flawed and outdated, and that the NPVIC does not
encroach on federal supremacy or on the rights of non-compacting sister
states. The NPVIC does not concern federal supremacy or a federal
interest because it would not change the system at all, and the NPVIC is
not radical enough of a compact to overturn hundreds of years of
Supreme Court precedent, since the Supreme Court has never
invalidated a compact based upon the effect on non-compacting sister
states.159
1.

Federal Supremacy? No Encroachment.

In analyzing whether or not the NPVIC encroaches on federal
supremacy, it is important to define what exactly federal supremacy
means. This definition can be found in the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution.160 The Supreme Court has interpreted this provision in
many ways; one of the landmark cases is M’Culloch v. Maryland.161
The Court held that the state of Maryland could not tax a federal bank
because if it had the power to do so, it would have the power to destroy
the federal institution, and that states would effectively become more
powerful than the federal government.162 This logic regarding the

155
156
157

U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 478 (1978).
See Muller, supra note 112; Williams, supra note 39; Bradley A. Smith, Vanity of Vanities:
National Popular Vote and the Electoral College, 7 ELECTION L.J. 196, 197 (2008); Tara Ross,
Legal and Logistical Ramifications of the National Popular Vote Plan, 11 ENGAGE: J.
FEDERALIST SOC’Y PRAC. GROUPS 37 (2010).
158 See Muller, supra note 112, at 372.
159 See infra note 188 and accompanying text.
160 “This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the
Land.” U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
161 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
162 See id.
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Supremacy Clause does not follow to the NPVIC—the NPVIC has no
threat on the federal government, and it certainly does not make the
states more powerful than the federal government.163 The federal
government has no control when it comes to presidential elections.164
Thus, if the NPVIC were to be put into effect, there would be no
disturbance in the balance of power—the states are simply exercising a
right they already have under the Constitution, and that has no effect on
federal authority.165 There is no relationship between the states and the
federal government here as there was in M’Culloch, when a state
directly tried to lessen the power of the national federal government.166
Additionally, if the Constitution is the supreme law of the land,167 then
the states’ plenary power under Article II is included in the Supremacy
Clause.168 The states that have enacted the NPVIC do not seek to
impose anything on the federal government; rather, they seek to
exercise the power they already have under the Constitution.169
One opponent to the NPVIC claims that all political compacts need
congressional consent, and that the Court in Virginia laid out all
possible types of non-political compacts:170 land purchases, contracting
to use a canal, draining a disease-causing swamp, and uniting to resist
pestilence.171 However, this argument fails to take into account the time
period in which Virginia was decided. This case was decided in 1893,172
at which point there was no way for the Court to know the effect the
Electoral College would have on American government, or that states
would eventually want to compact to allocate their electoral votes
differently.173 There was no way for the Court in 1893 to be able to
163 The states would not have more power than the federal government if the NPVIC were to
be enacted. It merely gives states a mechanism to enact electors in the manner they see fit, a right
explicitly granted in the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
164 Except in the event of a tie, at which point the House of Representatives has the deciding
vote. U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
165 See supra note 163.
166 See M’Culloch, 17 U.S. 316.
167 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
168 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
169 Id.
170 “Non-political”—meaning that the compact at issue does not affect national sovereignty.
Muller, supra note 112, at 382.
171 Id. at 383 (citing Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 518 (1893)).
172 Virginia, 148 U.S. 503.
173 1893 was over 100 years ago; needless to say the state of the country looked very different
than it does today. This was right at the beginning of the Industrial Revolution. See EDWARD C.
KIRKLAND, INDUSTRY COMES OF AGE, BUSINESS, LABOR, AND PUBLIC POLICY, 1860–1897
(1961). It was additionally during the woman’s suffrage movement. See REBECCA J. MEAD, HOW
THE VOTE WAS WON: WOMAN SUFFRAGE IN THE WESTERN UNITED STATES, 1868–1914 (2006).
Because of these historical differences, hindsight is not 20/20. For the Supreme Court in 1893 to
imagine what the state of the country would be like today would be comparable to the Supreme
Court now trying to imagine what the state of the country will be like in the year 2130.
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create an exhaustive list of all non-political compacts.174 The NPVIC is
not a political compact, despite the fact that it may seem like one on its
face. A political compact is not one that has to do with politics, but
rather one that affects national sovereignty. 175
Some argue that Article II of the Constitution does not give the
states the plenary power suggested to appoint their electors in the
manner they see fit—rather, although they have this power, it cannot be
used in ways that change the structure of the federal government.176
There have been attempts to compare the NPVIC to the congressional
term limits at issue in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,177 but these
are of no avail. First, a congressional term limit is incomparable to the
Electoral College, since they are two completely different constitutional
provisions.178 Additionally, the states’ power to impose congressional
limits on Congress has nothing to do with the states’ power to appoint
electors in a presidential election—we are dealing with two completely
different branches of government.179 Opponents have attempted to argue
that analogizing these two provisions is possible because the wording of
the constitutional provisions can be compared. Thus, the Framers would
believe that the NPVIC would irrevocably change the face of federal
government, which is not what was intended.180 However, this argument
is flawed. The Constitution is structured to guarantee a separation of
powers so there is no threat of tyranny to the federal government.181
Nothing relating to the NPVIC suggests that there is a threat of
tyranny182—if the Framers truly intended for these two provisions to be
so similarly worded that they can be compared, it seems as though that
these two provisions would at least be in the same section of the
Constitution—or at least, relating to the same branch of government.183
174 1893 was right before the start of the Progressive Era—which lasted roughly from 1903–
1917—a period of time in which the United States saw new forms of government regulation,
bipartisanship, socialism, and collective action. See Elizabeth Sanders, Symposium,
Rediscovering the Progressive Era, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 1281 (2011). With a time period like the
Progressive Era on the Court’s heels, it’s difficult to imagine that the Court could find a way to
create a list of all non-political compacts.
175 Muller, supra note 112.
176 Williams, supra note 39.
177 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
178 The two provisions are not even in the same Article of the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art.
II, § 1, cl. 2; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
179 Article I of the Constitution deals with legislative powers, whereas Article II of the
Constitution deals with executive powers. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4.
180 See Williams, supra note 39; Ross, supra note 157.
181 See United States v. Nichols, 784 F.3d 666 (10th Cir. 2015).
182 See generally NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE, supra note 8.
183 This is especially true since, as analyzed above, the Electoral College was one of the most
hotly debated topics during the Constitutional Convention. See Heather Green, Comment, The
National Popular Vote Compact: Horizontal Federalism and the Proper Role of Congress Under
the Compact Clause, 16 CHAP. L. REV. 211, 232–33 (2012); supra Part I.
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Another argument is that even if the states do have the ability to
exercise the rights laid out in Article II, the Guarantee Clause 184 would
prevent the NPVIC’s enactment, since the NPVIC does not guarantee a
federal republic government.185 Specifically, allowing a national
popular vote without a constitutional amendment does not guarantee a
republican form of government.186 However, this is a flawed argument,
because the Guarantee Clause protects a representative democracy, and
a national popular vote election of the president is perhaps the most
direct form of a representative democracy this nation has seen—each
person being represented equally, more so than in the Electoral
College.187
2.

Non-Compacting Sister States’ Rights? No Encroachment.

It is important to note that the Supreme Court has never invalidated
a compact based on the effect on non-compacting sister states.188 Thus,
for the Court to do so, it would take an extremely invasive and radical
compact for the Court to depart from hundreds of years of precedent.
Some opponents argue that the NPVIC seeks to make larger
compacting states more powerful at the expense of smaller, noncompacting states.189 They mistakenly attempt to compare a compact
involving a border dispute to the NPVIC, and in the wake of Virginia,
make a sweeping generalization that the Court “would” ultimately
define a political compact as one that “aggrandiz[es] the political power
of the compacting states[,]”190 and conclude that if the Court were
deciding on the NPVIC, it would deem it unconstitutional on these
grounds.191 This claim is a big jump from discussing compacts that deal
with border disputes.192 Additionally, this argument fails to take into
consideration the fact that the NPVIC would not increase the political

184
185

U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
See Kristin Feeley, Comment, Guaranteeing a Federally Elected President, 103 NW. U. L.
REV. 1427 (2009).
186 Id. at 1444.
187 See, e.g., Fred O. Smith, Jr., Awakening the People’s Giant: Sovereign Immunity and the
Constitution’s Republican Commitment, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1941 (2012).
188 See U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452 (1978); Ne. Bancorp, Inc. v.
Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 472 U.S. 159 (1985) (determining that while noncompacting sister state interests are an important inquiry in evaluating whether or not a compact
violates the Compact Clause, it is not dispositive).
189 Muller, supra note 112, at 385.
190 Id. at 384.
191 Id.
192 A compact dealing with border disputes has virtually nothing to do with a compact like the
NPVIC—they are from two different realms.
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power of compacting states.193 While it is true that presidential
candidates may visit these states more often if the NPVIC were to go
into effect, this does not mean that their political power will be
“aggrandized.” More presidential candidate visits do not mean that a
state’s political power is increased.194 The states are not seeking to
increase the number of electoral votes they allocate; in fact, these states’
political influence would arguably remain the same.195
Another argument opponents make is that since the NPVIC goes
into effect when it has the majority number of electoral votes, if it were
to go into effect, it would “guarantee” the winner of the presidential
election by the national popular vote—thus, non-compacting minority
states could lose their appointment of electors.196 This is simply not the
case. The NPVIC does not take away the constitutional rights of other
non-compacting states to appoint their electors in the manner they see
fit.197 Nor does the NPVIC guarantee the winner of the presidential
election by national popular vote—there have been times in the nation’s
history where the president won the election by only a narrow margin of
national popular vote votes.198 Thus, this argument does not show that
non-compacting sister states would become irrelevant, unless opponents
want to claim that fewer presidential visits to states makes states
completely irrelevant, which has no factual basis.199 If this logic were to
193 KOZA, supra note 59, at 457 (explaining that smaller states are currently disadvantaged by
the winner-take-all system and if smaller states were to compact, they would arguably have more
political influence than they do now).
194 Id.
195 Id. at 473–74 (explaining that the equal representation of the states in the Senate is
protected by the Constitution and cannot be changed by any kind of compact, and that the NPVIC
does not affect this equal representation laid out in the Constitution—the mechanism that creates
the Electoral College).
196 Muller, supra note 112, at 391.
197 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. Other scholars have also taken this approach. In an Article
that was written in 2002 (before the NPVIC was formulated), Robert Bennett saw something like
the NPVIC coming, and he determined that:

[I]t is far from clear that ‘compacting’ states could be seen as ‘enhancing’ their
political power. . . . A state’s influence after the suggested change . . . is highly
contingent and unpredictable, providing only the most fragile basis for making any
‘enhancement’ judgment. . . . [A] degree of state coordination in the move to a
nationwide popular vote would likely survive a Compact Clause challenge.
Robert W. Bennett, State Coordination in Popular Election of the President Without a
Constitutional Amendment, 5 GREEN BAG 2d 141, 145–46 (2002).
198 See supra Section I.A.
199 Presidential campaign visits do not equal political influence. The political influence a state
has resides in the amount of electoral votes it has—for this is what ultimately decides the
outcome of an election. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2. Additionally, studies conducted have
concluded that political campaigns generally have little influence on the outcome of the election.
See Henry E. Brady, Richard Johnston & John Sides, The Study of Political Campaigns,
http://home.gwu.edu/~jsides/study.pdf (last visited Nov. 20, 2015). It is generally very difficult to
change a voter’s mind once he has decided which candidate he is voting for, and campaigns won’t
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be applied to the Electoral College today, it can be said that large or
battleground states take away the constitutional rights of small nonswing states, since the latter are disadvantaged by the actions of the
former; if this logic were applied, there would be no solution to the
problem of how to elect the president.
Justice White’s dissent in U.S. Steel Corp.—regarding the
expansion of the Virginia rule—says that groups of states cannot take
action collectively even if they are permitted to do so individually.200
However, proponents who use this argument fail to take into account
that this is a dissenting opinion—thus, it is by no means law—and there
is no other evidence to support this argument. In fact, state collective
action can arguably be beneficial for both the federal government and
its individuals.201 They argue that the Compact Clause concerns the
relationship of non-compacting sister states in addition to the general
federal interest.202 While the NPVIC may “concern” the relationship of
non-compacting sister states, this concern alone is not sufficient to deem
it an unconstitutional compact.203 In addition, the NPVIC does not
concern the federal interest—there would be absolutely no change in the
federal system at all.204
In U.S. Steel Corp., the Court held that the compact at issue (a tax
compact) did not affect non-compacting sister states especially with
regards to the Privileges and Immunities Clause,205 since the pressure of
the Multistate Tax Compact was not great enough to deem the rights of
these states so affected.206 In interpreting this section, scholars have
noted that a secondary effect is not enough for a non-compacting sister
change that bias. See id. This shows that just because a presidential candidate makes a certain
number of visits to certain states does not mean that particular states have greater political
influence.
200 U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452, 482 (1978) (White, J.,
dissenting).
201 See Note, State Collective Action, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1855 (2006). Additionally, it can
maximize social welfare by creating benefits and without imposing costs on others. See id.
202 Muller, supra note 112, at 385 (citing the opinion set out in Rhode Island v. Massachusetts,
which said that the Compact Clause intended to “guard against the derangement of [the states’]
federal relations with the other states of the Union, and the federal government . . . .” (Rhode
Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. 657, 726 (1838))).
203 Since the NPVIC has not gone into effect yet, it is impossible to say what the effect on
non-compacting sister states will be. See generally NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE, supra note 8.
204 See KOZA, supra note 59; see generally NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE, supra note 8.
205 “The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in
the several States.” U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
206 The Court stated, “Any time a State adopts a fiscal or administrative policy that affects the
programs of a sister State, pressure to modify those programs may result. Unless that pressure
transgresses the bounds of the Commerce Clause or the Privileges and Immunities Clause . . . it is
not clear how [the] federal structure is implicated.” U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n,
434 U.S. 452, 478 (1978); see Bradley T. Turflinger, Note, Fifty Republics and the National
Popular Vote: How the Guarantee Clause Should Protect States Striving for Equal Protection in
Presidential Elections, 45 VAL. U. L. REV. 793, 812–13 (2011).
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state to claim that its rights have been infringed upon due to the effect
of a compact.207 In the case of the NPVIC, non-compacting states would
not suffer a secondary effect because the NPVIC does not take away
any of their rights or attempt to diminish them in any way. 208 Just
because an effect of the NPVIC may be that smaller states get less
presidential candidate attention, this is not a primary, or even a
secondary, effect.
In light of the relevant case law, constitutional provisions, and
scholarly commentary, it is clear that the National Popular Vote
Interstate Compact passes the Compact Clause tests set out by the Court
since it does not encroach on federal supremacy and it does not so
gravely encroach on the rights of non-compacting sister states.209 The
NPVIC passes both the Virginia and the U.S. Steel Corp. tests,210 and
the states are not exercising any constitutional right they would not have
had.211 It does not matter if the NPVIC is in place or not; states
choosing to allocate their electoral votes in a different way is a power
they have under Article II Section 1.212
III. IN THE CASE OF CITIZENS OF A NON-COMPACTING SISTER STATE
VERSUS CITIZENS OF A COMPACTING STATE: THE FORMER IS LEFT
WITHOUT A LEG TO STAND ON
This Part will provide an important solution to the problem set out
in the preceding sections: since the NPVIC passes all Compact Clause
tests—thus, it does not need congressional consent for its enactment—
and the states have plenary power under Article II to appoint their
electors in the manner they see fit, one of the only ways for the NPVIC
to be challenged and/or abolished is if a non-compacting sister state
chose to bring suit against a compacting state in order to get rid of the
law. However, this Note argues that even if the merits of the claim are
constitutional, courts should dismiss these cases because the noncompacting sister state would not have standing to bring such a suit.213
Since the NPVIC does not require congressional consent and a lawsuit
of this type would not survive, there is virtually nothing stopping the
207
208
209
210
211
212
213

Turflinger, supra note 206, at 833–34.
See generally NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE, supra note 8.
See infra Part III.
See U.S. Steel Corp., 434 U.S. 452.
See generally U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
Id.
Standing is required for any litigant to bring a suit—this means that a party must have
injury, causation, and redressability in order for the case to be heard. See infra notes 215–217 and
accompanying text. This Note will further analyze these doctrines and conclude that a noncompacting sister state attempting to bring suit would have no standing in such a case.
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NPVICs enactment if it were to acquire the necessary 270 electoral
votes needed for it to pass.214 Because the NPVIC passes all
constitutional tests, a state could not go before a court and assert that the
statute is unconstitutional—it would have to attempt to assert a different
argument.
In order for a plaintiff to have Article III standing, it must show
three elements: injury-in-fact (a specific injury—meaning that a
plaintiff cannot simply go to court wanting to change the law),
causation215 (the law that is being challenged must have caused the
injury and/or the defendant must have caused the injury), and
redressability (the issue must be capable of being redressed by the
court).216 One of the most frequently litigated prongs that arise in cases
is the injury-in-fact prong.217 The United States Supreme Court has
stated that in order to meet the standing requirements outlined in Article
III,218 a plaintiff must prove that he has a “personal stake” in the dispute
and the alleged injury is particularized to him.219
Prudential standing issues arise when the plaintiff may have Article
III standing, but a court still should not take the case whether it is for
policy reasons, or that the dispute would be more effectively resolved
with another branch of government.220 One instance of when this
214
215
216

See generally NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE, supra note 8.
This Note will not evaluate the causation prong of constitutionally-required standing.
For example, when an issue is better suited with the legislature rather than with the court.
See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984); Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573–74
(1992) (holding that although the plaintiffs had constitutionally-required standing in challenging
the actions of the Endangered Species Act of 1973, they did not have prudential standing because
they were asserting a “generalized grievance” since they could not prove that they were directly
affected by the statute at issue).
217 See, e.g., Conservation Law Found. v. EPA, 964 F.Supp.2d 175, 186, 188 (D. Mass. 2013)
(holding that citizens that petitioned the Environmental Protection Agency in order to change
their policies on certain climate change issues did not have constitutionally-required standing
because they did not allege a specific injury in fact that directly affected them); Simon v. E.
Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 39–40 (1976) (holding that organizations that sought
to promote health service access to the poor could not establish constitutionally-required standing
simply by this goal alone). Courts have even determined that there are instances where State
Senates do not have constitutionally-required standing. See Favors v. Cuomo, No. 11-cv-5632,
2013 WL 5818773 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 2013) (holding that the Senate Minority did not have a
personal interest in alleging that a certain Senate plan violated the equal population requirement
of the Fourteenth Amendment).
218 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
219 See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818–19 (1997) (citing Allen, 468 U.S. 737); see also
Coastal Outdoor Advert. Grp. v. Township of E. Hanover, 630 F.Supp.2d 446, 450 (D.N.J. 2009)
(quoting Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11–12 (2004)) (“In addition to the
constitutionally-required standing factors, prudential factors also apply, which constitute
‘judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction.’”).
220 “[A] plaintiff raising only a generally available grievance about government—claiming
only harm to his and every citizen’s interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws,
and seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at
large—does not state an Article III case or controversy.” Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573–74.
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happens is when the plaintiff is asserting a “generalized grievance,”
rather than a specific injury. 221 In the case of the NPVIC, the plaintiffs
in such a case would be asserting a generalized grievance, and would
simply be going to the court to complain about how the political arena
has arrayed itself, rather than alleging a specific, direct injury.222
Additionally, the citizens of a non-compacting sister state would not be
able to claim that they have standing because they are taxpayers of a
state, since the Court has struck down this idea.223 The rest of this Part
will focus on how a hypothetical plaintiff in the case of the NPVIC
would have neither constitutionally-required nor prudential standing to
succeed in a case.
A.

Article III Standing Fails

First, a non-compacting state seeking to bring suit would not have
Article III standing because it would not have an injury-in-fact. As the
Court in Raines said, the state would not be able to allege a specific,
personal injury that is directly particularized.224 For example, a state
would go before a court asserting that the NPVIC has adversely affected
them because they now do not have as much political influence,
presidential candidates are not visiting their state as much, etc.
However, as this Note previously explored, there is nothing to support
these arguments and there is no evidence to suggest that presidential
candidate visits are directly correlated with political influence.225 In
addition to not having an injury-in-fact, the plaintiffs would also not
satisfy the redressability requirement of constitutionally-required
standing.226 If a suit such as this were to arise, the court would
determine that it could not redress the injury that the plaintiff is
221 Id.; see also Allen, 468 U.S. 737 (explaining that parents of children in private segregated
schools do not have standing because they are simply coming to the Court with a problem that the
political area has arrayed itself). The Court explains that in order to solve this problem, the
plaintiffs should have gone to the legislature. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 606. But see Flast v. Cohen, 392
U.S. 83 (1968) (explaining that the only exception in the generalized standing principle is when
government expenditures are being challenged under the Establishment Clause of the
Constitution). This is the only exception to standing that’s been addressed by the Supreme Court,
and the NPVIC does not fall within this exception. Id. at 105.
222 Since the party would not go to the Court asking for a change in the laws, that is not a
specific injury; that is a proper question for the legislature, not the Court. Allen, 468 U.S. at 761.
223 United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974) (holding that a taxpayer cannot go to the
Court asking how the CIA spends tax dollars, since that is not a direct injury since all members of
the public share the injury and the judiciary can’t act as a “second guessing mechanism”).
224 Raines, 521 U.S. at 829–30.
225 See supra note 199.
226 Additionally, the Ninth Circuit has defined redressability as requiring “an analysis of
whether the court has the power to right or to prevent the claimed injury.” Gonzales v. Gorsuch,
688 F.2d 1263, 1267 (9th Cir. 1982).
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claiming it has, since it is not certain whether or not the court’s remedy
would fix the plaintiff’s injury.227
B.

Prudential Standing Fails

Even in the rare occurrence that a court does determine that the
plaintiff has constitutionally-required standing, it would still dismiss the
case on the grounds that the plaintiff does not have prudential standing,
meaning that the alleged injury is a generalized grievance that is more
capable of being remedied by another branch of government—here, the
legislature.228 The plaintiff would have to allege something more than
the “generalized interest of all citizens in constitutional governance.”229
There could not be a more perfect generalized grievance than the fact
that the citizens of the non-compacting sister state do not like the law.
Hypothetically, their argument would go something along the lines of
the following: “The National Popular Vote Interstate Compact
adversely impacts us as citizens because if it were to go into effect we
would have less political influence in presidential elections than we do
today under the Electoral College.” The plaintiff would effectively be
alleging that they did not like the law because of the effect it has on all
citizens, which is prohibited under traditional prudential standing
principles.230
Thus, the entire argument of citizens attempting to oppose the
National Popular Vote Interstate Compact in court would first try to rely
on Article III standing. This would fail since they would not be able to
allege a specific injury-in-fact that directly affects the plaintiff alone,
since they would not be able to successfully argue that their political
influence would be diminished if the NPVIC were to go into effect. The
plaintiffs would additionally not satisfy the redressability prong of
constitutionally-required standing, since the issue is not capable of
being redressed by the court and would be more appropriately by the
legislature.231 Next, even if a court were to find that the plaintiff did
have Article III standing, the plaintiff would not have prudential
227 See, e.g., Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587 (2007) (holding that
the “mental displeasure” injury alleged by the plaintiff is not capable of being redressed by the
Court).
228 See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 761 (1984); Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control
Components, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 1377, 1387–89 (2014).
229 Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 217 (1974); see, e.g.,
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974). “[A]
‘generalized grievance,’ no matter how sincere, is insufficient to confer standing.” Hollingsworth
v. Perry, 133 S.Ct. 2652, 2662 (2013).
230 Hollingsworth, 133 S.Ct. at 2662.
231 See supra note 220.
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standing since it would be asserting a generalized grievance that affects
“all citizens in constitutional governance.”232 A court would have no
choice but to hold that, although the generalized grievance is sincere,
the alleged injuries and the generalized grievances the plaintiffs allege
do not amount to satisfy any prong of standing233—and the case would
be dismissed.
C.

What About the Candidates?

Another standing argument briefly worth addressing is, after the
NPVIC gets enacted, what if a presidential candidate wins in a state
using the Electoral College, but does not win the national popular vote?
That is, the flip side of what happened in the infamous 2000 presidential
election. This would mean that they would effectively have to give up
their electoral votes. If that candidate were to bring a suit, would that
candidate have standing, and would it be a successful suit? It is likely
that a candidate would have a better argument for standing than a state
would, considering they effectively lost the presidency because of the
NPVIC—thus, a direct injury.234 However, it would have to depend on
the results of the election: if losing those electoral votes cost the
candidate the election, there is a better argument for standing.
However, even if standing could be established, there will likely be
no remedies available for such a candidate, and they would likely lose
the suit, just as in 2000.235 While the Court in 2000 did not specifically
address the Electoral College issue, the result was the same in that the
Electoral College system remained unchanged, and Gore did not assume
the presidency as a result of this case.236
CONCLUSION
It is no secret that the Electoral College is one of the most
controversial and one of the most challenged constitutional provisions
in the Constitution.237 After the infamous 2000 election, this became
even more so—people were appalled that a presidential election could
turn out this way, voters felt as if their votes did not count, and people
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See supra Section III.B.
See supra Sections III.A. & B.
See supra note 217.
See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
See id.
See supra Part II.
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sought reform.238 There have been many attempts to abolish the
amendment239—all unsuccessful—and there have been many proposed
solutions to the problem—all unavailing or impossible to enact.240 The
National Popular Vote Interstate Compact is leading the way—a
compact that would change the system, without changing the system. 241
The most common criticism of the NPVIC is that it is an
unconstitutional compact since it does not have congressional
consent.242 However, as this Note shows, congressional consent is not
needed in the case of the NPVIC because it does not encroach on
federal supremacy243 or on the rights of non-compacting sister states.244
As it passes both the Virginia and U.S. Steel Corp. compact tests,
congressional consent is not necessary.245
With all of this in mind, the next avenue opponents of the NPVIC
could attempt to travel down is seeking a remedy from a court.
However, it would quickly be determined that citizens of noncompacting sister states do not have a leg to stand on—they have
neither constitutionally-required nor prudential standing to bring such a
suit.246 They would not be able to allege a specific injury in fact capable
of redressability by a court (since lesser political influence should not be
considered an injury), and their assertion of a generalized grievance
would further reinforce the fact that the courts are not the place for these
citizens to be challenging the NPVIC.247
Since the National Popular Vote Interstate Compact is not an
unconstitutional compact because it does not require congressional
consent and it does not encroach on federal supremacy or the rights of
non-compacting sister states, and since citizens of non-compacting
sister states would not have standing to bring suit, there is virtually
nothing stopping the NPVICs enactment. This is not harmful or
threatening to democracy since the NPVIC would be wholly more
democratic than the Electoral College system today. Once the number
of states that enact the compact electoral votes reaches 270, the National
Popular Vote Interstate Compact will largely determine the outcome of
the election of the president of the United States.
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See supra Section II.C.
See supra Section II.A.
See supra Section II.C.
See KOZA, supra note 59; see generally NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE, supra note 8.
See supra Part II.
See supra Section II.C.1.
See supra Section II.C.2.
See Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503 (1893); U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax
Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452 (1978); supra Section II.C.
246 See supra Part III.
247 See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); supra Section III.B.

